Wednesday, 20 July 2016 00:00

Is Turkey Becoming a Banana Republic?

Article, The Turkey Analyst, July 20, 2016

Svante E. Cornell, "Is Turkey Becoming a Banana Republic?"

The failed military coup in Turkey provides a window into just how unstable and vulnerable Turkey has become. The coup is a unique but not isolated event, more than anything a symptom of the decay of Turkish state institutions under Erdogan. The sizable post-coup repression will make matters worse, in fact increasing rather than decreasing the risk of further violence, including a new coup. Turkey is now more a problem in its own right than an ally to help solve regional problems.

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Published in Staff Publications

Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, July 19, 2016

Svante E. Cornell, "A botched coup and Turkey’s descent into madness"

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A lot remains unclear regarding the attempted coup that shook Turkey. But it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about its background and implications.

The coup was not planned and implemented within the chain of command. The Chief of General Staff and the heads of the crucial First Army and Special Forces remained loyal to the government. This, not people on the street, was the key reason the coup failed. Not least, it allowed President Erdogan to slip out of Marmaris before being caught and to get to Istanbul.

The coup appears to have been hastily put together and poorly implemented. The failure to seize or liquidate the president, cabinet, and vital communication infrastructure made it possible for Erdogan to regain the initiative. This suggests that the plotters’ hands were forced, and that the coup was launched prematurely. There are suggestions that a list was leaked before the coup of officers scheduled for discharge and arrest, which could have precipitated the coup, explaining the lack of proper preparation.

The most vexing question concerns the exact identity of the coup plotters. Who were the architects behind what appears on the surface to be a faceless, even leaderless coup? The Turkish government is pointing fingers at the Fethullah Gülen movement – something that may seem counter-intuitive, because it was precisely Erodgan’s confrontation with them two years ago that led him to let the military back in from the cold and rebuild for himself a ruling coalition much more right-wing nationalist in nature, united by the struggle against the Kurds.

But that said, it has long been assumed that Gülenist cliques were present in the military at mid-career ranks. But no one believes that Gülenist officers had risen to the ranks of three or four star generals. Thus, while it is very likely that Gülenist officers were involved, it is equally obvious that they could not have carried this out on their own. The more senior generals apparently involved do not seem to have any Gülenist affiliations.

Hence, the coup may have been carried out by an unholy alliance between a faction of old-school Kemalist and Gülenist officers. If this is the case, it would mean that while Erdogan allied with the top military brass against the Gülenists, another military fraction allied with the Gülenists against Erdogan.

This is what Turkey has come to: its politics in the past few years can best be understood as a struggle for power between two Islamic sects. In the process, Turkey’s military appears now to have at least three separate fractions and to be much more politicized and divided than has been assumed.

A further important aspect of the coup was President Erdogan’s response: he mobilised his supporters through the use of Islamic rhetoric that would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Mosques were ordered by the State religious directorate, which Erdogan has built up into a behemoth, to broadcast calls for prayer all through the night and to call regime supporters out on the streets. Often, the call appears to have been framed as “Jihad”.

And indeed, those who came out to oppose the coup almost exclusively looked like Islamist activists singing Islamist chants. It is already apparent that President Erdogan has concluded that Islamist mobilisation was what saved him, hence the remaining inhibitions against further Islamisation of Turkey will dissipate. Erdogan’s Turkey is likely to more openly deploy Islamist rhetoric and policies.

The Gülen fraternity’s alleged responsibility for the coup is already being used as pretext for a full-scale purge of state institutions. Unlike previous occasions, the coup gives Erdogan the opportunity to arrest and jail opponents by the thousands. It is already clear that repression will spread beyond Gülenists: entire lists of scholars, journalists and officials to be jailed have already been leaked. Whatever is left of Turkish democracy is about to be neutralised, and if Erdogan completes this repressive purge, it goes without saying that Turkey can no longer be called a democracy.

The failed coup will have important foreign policy implications. Erdogan and his entourage have long believed the Gülen fraternity to be following Washington’s orders, and senior government officials have already suggested that the U.S. was behind the coup. Erdogan appears to be making extradition of Gülen a litmus test of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, a demand that will likely not be granted, given the lack of any kind of concrete evidence. In fact, the involvement of Gülenist officers does not necessary implicate the ailing preacher himself in the coup.

In any case, the U.S.-Turkish relationships has been put at risk, and Secretary John Kerry’s threat of consequences for Turkey’s NATO membership has shown that perhaps Washington is tiring of Erdogan’s antics. The most likely immediate point of contention will be the Incirlik military base, which the U.S. uses to hit ISIS targets in Syria.

Similarly, Turkey-EU relations will be impacted, most immediately because it is hard to imagine how the EU will now go ahead with visa liberalisation. In turn, that likely puts the cynical migration deal between Brussels and Ankara to death. If Turkey reinstates the death penalty, which is quite plausible, Turkish-EU relations are likely to deteriorate even further.

In conclusion, it is important to see the coup attempt as an indication of the deeper decay of the Turkish state under Erdogan’s rule. As Erdogan has sought to concentrate power in his own hands, the exercise of power has become increasingly informal, all checks and balances removed, and all institutions including his own political party increasingly ineffectual. This made the coup possible in the first place, and future coups can be avoided only if Turkey develops strong, accountable democratic institutions.

But instead, under Erdogan’s personal rule, Turkey’s destabilisation is likely to continue. Thus, European leaders now need to see what has been obvious for some time: rather than an ally with which to handle regional problems, Turkey will itself increasingly be the problem.

 

Svante E. Cornell is Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Published in Staff Publications

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TRANSIT FORUM with the Embassies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey

Thursday, 28 April, 2016, from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

 

The Central Asia, Caspian, South Caucasus and Black Sea regions together form a strategically important transit corridor between China and Europe. Connecting trade, people and economies, the modern trans-Caspian trade and transit routes from China to Europe, envisages an extensive and integrated network of infrastructure, special economic zones, harmonized customs, and cross-border procedures along this route.

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey combined represent a market of more than 110 million consumers. These countries are able to offer customized and integrated solutions to companies with highly sophisticated supply chains.

Video of the forum can now be viewed on the SAIS Events YouTube channel.

On Thursday, April 28, 2016, the Embassies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey to the U.S.A., are organizing the “Trans-Caspian East-West Trade and Transit Corridor” Forum in Washington, D.C., in partnership with the World Bank Group, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Council for International Understanding, Boeing Company, U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, AmCham Azerbaijan, America-Georgia Business Council, U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association, AmCham Kazakhstan, AmCham Georgia, and Turkish-American Business Association/AmCham Turkey. 

This special all-day forum, hosted by the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, will introduce projects and investments along the modern Silk Road to U.S. business leaders across a variety of multinational industries. 

Speakers at this special forum include:  Ambassador Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijan; Ambassador Archil Gegeshidze, Georgia; Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Kazakhstan; Ambassador Serdar Kılıç, Turkey; Mr. Gary Litman, VP, US Chamber of Commerce;  S. Frederick Starr, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, JHU-SAIS; Dr. Taleh Ziyadov, Director-General, Baku International Sea and Trade Port;  Mr. Rauf Valiyev, Chairman, Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping; Mr. Mamuka Bakhtadze, CEO, Georgian Railways; Ms. Ketevan Salukvadze, Head of Transport Policy Dept., Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development; Mr. Askar Mamin, President, Kazakhstan Railways; Mr. Sanzhar Yelubayev, President of KTZ Express; Mr. Osman Nuri Beyhan, Deputy Director General for EU and International Affairs, Ministry of Customs and Trade; and others TBA.

 

Schedule, Thursday, 28 April 2016:

     8:00  -  9:00 a.m.   Continental breakfast

     9:00 - 10:00 a.m.   Welcome by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, the US
                                   Dept of State, Ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
                                   Kazakhstan, and Turkey, and representatives from the US
                                   Chamber of Commerce

    10:00 - 11:00 a.m.  Panel #1: "Trans-South Caucasus Customs and Trade
                                   Facilitation: What Needs to Be Done?"
                                   Moderator:  S. Frederick Starr

     11:00 - 11:25 a.m.  Q & A

     11:25 - 11:40 a.m.  Break (refreshments)

     11:40 - 12:40 p.m.  Panel #2:  "'From Sea to Sea' Integrated Regional Transit
                                    and Logistics Infrastructure."
                                    Moderator: TBD

     12:40  -  1:00 p.m.  Q & A

       1:00  -  2:00 p.m.  Lunch served in the auditorium

       2:00 -  3:00 p.m.   Panel #3 "Commercial and Investment Opportunities:
                                    Financing, Logistics, and Supply Chain."  
                                    Moderator: Jorg Frieden, Executive Director, The World
                                    Bank Group

       3:00 -  3:25 p.m.   Q & A

        3:25 -  4:00 p.m.  Closing remarks

 

 

Please note location of this forum: 
Kenney Auditorium, Nitze Building
SAIS - Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC  20036
 

 

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Published in Forums & Events
Tuesday, 29 March 2016 11:32

NATO Must Demand More From Turkey

more-from-turkeyMarch 29, 2016

THE NEW YORK TIMES

NATO Must Demand More From Turkey

By Halil M. Karaveli

Turkey has always been an awkward NATO member. Since it joined in 1952, the country has rarely lived up to official alliance standards of democracy and human rights. During most of this time, Turkey has been ruled by authoritarian governments. Even when elected governments were in power, Turkey was at best an illiberal “democracy” as right-wing authoritarianism and rigid nationalism were always influential. In that sense, there is nothing that is new with Turkey’s authoritarian “drift” today.

Published in Staff Publications

Svenska Dagbladet, March 19, 2016.

Svante E. Cornell, Turkiet är ett hot – inte en potentiell EU-medlem.

EU borde akta sig för att knyta för nära band med Erdogans auktoritärt styrda Turkiet. Landet borgar inte för fred och säkerhet just nu. Tvärtom. Svante Cornell menar att det borde vara uteslutet att ens diskutera turkiskt EU-medlemskap medan hundratusentals kurder drivs från sina hem i sydöstra Turkiet.

Click to read.

Svante E. Cornell is Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Published in Staff Publications

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News

  • Read CACI Chairman S. Frederick Starr's recent interview on the resurgence of Imperial Russia with The American Purpose
    Tuesday, 23 May 2023 00:00

    Why Russians Support the War: Jeffrey Gedmin interviews S. Frederick Starr on the resurgence of Imperial Russia.

    The American Purpose, May 23, 2023

    Jeffrey Gedmin: Do we have a Putin problem or a Russia problem today?

    S. Frederick Starr: We have a Putin problem because we have a Russia problem. Bluntly, the mass of Russians are passive and easily manipulated—down to the moment they aren’t. Two decades ago they made a deal with Vladimir Putin, as they have done with many of his predecessors: You give us a basic income, prospects for a better future, and a country we can take pride in, and we will give you a free hand. This is the same formula for autocracy that prevailed in Soviet times, and, before that, under the czars. The difference is that this time Russia’s leader—Putin—and his entourage have adopted a bizarre and dangerous ideology, “Eurasianism,” that empowers them to expand Russian power at will over the entire former territory of the USSR and even beyond. It is a grand and awful vision that puffs up ruler and ruled alike.

    What do most Russians think of this deal? It leaves them bereft of the normal rights of citizenship but free from its day-to-day responsibilities. So instead of debating, voting, and demonstrating, Russians store up their frustrations and then release them in elemental, often destructive, and usually futile acts of rebellion. This “Russia problem” leaves the prospect of change in Russia today in the hands of alienated members of Putin’s immediate entourage, many of whom share his vision of Russia’s destiny and are anyway subject to Putin’s ample levers for control. Thus, our “Putin problem” arises from our “Russia problem.”

    Click to continue reading...

  • CACI director Svante Cornell's interviewed on the 'John Batchelor Show' podcast regarding Turkey's 2023 presidential election
    Friday, 19 May 2023 00:00

    Listen to CACI director Svante Cornell's recent interview on the 'John Batchelor Show' podcast regarding Turkey's 2023 presidential election. Click here!

  • New Article Series on Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus
    Wednesday, 24 November 2021 11:53

    Eurasia

  • CACI Initiative on Religion and the Secular State in Central Asia and the Caucasus
    Sunday, 24 January 2021 13:53

    In 2016, the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program launched an initiative on documenting the interrelationship of religion and the secular state in the region. This initiative departed from the fact that little systematic reserch had been undertaken on the subject thus far. While there was and remains much commentary and criticism of religious policy in the region, there was no comprehensive analysis available on the interrelationship of religion and the state in any regional state, let alone the region as a whole. The result of this initiative has been the publication of six Silk Road Papers studying the matter in regional states, with more to come. In addition, work is ongoing on a volume putting the regional situation in the context of the Muslim world as a whole.

     

    Case Studies

    Each study below can be freely downloaded in PDF format.

    az-formula-SRSP

    Azerbaijan's Formula: Secular Governance and Civil Nationhood
    By Svante E. Cornell, Halil Karaveli, and Boris Ajeganov
    November 2016   




    2018-04-Kazakhstan-SecularismReligion and the Secular State in Kazakhstan
    By Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr and Julian Tucker
    April 2018

     

     

     

    1806-UZ-coverReligion and the Secular State in Uzbekistan
    Svante E. Cornell and Jacob Zenn
    June 2018

     

     

     

    2006-Engvall-coverReligion and the Secular State in Kyrgyzstan
    Johan Engvall
    June 2020

     Event video online

     

    2006-Clement-coverReligion and the Secular State in Turkmenistan
    Victoria Clement
    June 2020

    Event video online

     

     

     

    Articles and Analyses

    Svante E. Cornell, "Religion and the State in Central Asia," in Ilan Berman, ed., Wars of Ideas: Theology, Interpretation and Power in the Muslim World, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

    Svante E. Cornell, "Central Asia: Where Did Islamic Radicalization Go?" in Religion, Conflict and Stability in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Katya Migacheva and Bryan Frederick, Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2018.