The West's Inflection Point in the Caucasus: Untying the Georgian Knot
By John DiPirro and Laura Linderman
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Silk Road Paper
July 2025
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Executive Summary:
Since the summer of 2019, Georgia has cycled through periods of crisis and partial recovery, with the increasingly kleptocratic and authoritarian Georgian Dream (GD) government developing sophisticated methods to control public discourse and opinion. The fundamental question that Western policymakers can no longer avoid is: What is more important—a democratic Georgia or a cooperative, friendly Georgia? For years, these aspirations were aligned, but today they have diverged into mutually exclusive policy pathways, each carrying profound implications for regional stability and the credibility of Western engagement.
While many Western analysts point to Georgian Dream and its founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, as the primary drivers of democratic decline, this view oversimplifies the situation. A fuller understanding must also consider the opposition's failure to offer credible alternatives, the legacy of Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party, and inconsistent Western engagement, all contributing to instability and strategic ambiguity.
In recent discussions with regional experts, civil society leaders and opposition figures, a common critique emerged: the absence of a coherent, responsive, and consistently updated Western policy toward Georgia. Shifting Western priorities have undermined long-term strategic alignment, especially given evolving global dynamics and the growing influence of powers like Russia and China. Given global shifts—including a more transactional U.S. foreign policy under the Trump Administration and Europe's growing focus on defense infrastructure—will the West remain committed to Georgia, or has "Georgia fatigue" taken hold?
This analysis examines the history and impact of Western support for Georgia, particularly in economic development, energy cooperation, and democratic reform. While Georgians are ultimately responsible for their national trajectory, the West must reckon with its strategic missteps that have shaped Georgia's current geopolitical position. Western policymakers must recalibrate their approach for an evolving international order and clearly articulate their desired relationship with Georgia. This recalibration requires acknowledging past errors and choosing whether to remedy them or pursue a pragmatic reset in relations.
Gone but Not Forgotten: The Central Asian Union, 1990–2005
By Sanat Kushkumbayev
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Silk Road Paper
June 2025
Executive Summary
The post-Soviet landscape of Central Asia, characterized by an intricate web of cultural ties, shared histories, and political ambitions, presents a unique case of regional integration that has both fascinated and perplexed international observers. From 1991 to 2005, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan worked assiduously to develop regional cooperation, an effort that had to contend with conflicting national interests and external geopolitical pressures.
The early years following the Soviet dissolution ushered in a moment of hope for a “Golden Age” of integration. Between 1992 and 1998, regional leaders embarked on ambitious initiatives aimed at constructing a new order that would facilitate collaboration and mutual development. However, as idealism gave way to pragmatism, the stark realities of internal and external challenges emerged.
From 1998 to 2002, the dynamics within Central Asia became increasingly contentious, with external powers asserting their influence and regional leaders jockeying for position. Despite the opportunities for collaboration, the interplay between national ambitions and external interests led to a dilution of collective efforts and a hesitation to fully commit to regional integration paths.
Still, the accomplishments of Central Asian regionalism were significant, especially coming at a time when the states of the region were focused primarily on the building of national sovereignty. In other words, they always saw the strengthening of sovereignty as entirely compatible with the development of regional cooperation.
The later phase, from 2002 to 2005, witnessed a significant decline in the momentum for regional initiatives against the backdrop of geopolitical shifts and mounting internal crises. The influence of larger powers, particularly Russia, shifted the focus of regional cooperation away from original Central Asian projects, culminating in key initiatives like the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) being subsumed into broader Eurasian frameworks.
This comprehensive analysis underscores the complexity of Central Asia's road to regional integration, highlighting the intricate balance between national aspirations and the overarching influence of external geopolitical factors. It serves as a crucial reflection for policymakers, analysts, and scholars interested in the intersection of regional dynamics and global geopolitics. In particular, as Central Asian states are once again embarked on a quest to deepen and institutionalize their regional cooperation, the lessons of the past attempts to build regional institutions will be valuable to the region’s leaders as well as external supporters of this process.
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Is Central Asia Stable? Conflict Risks and Drivers of Instability
By Svante E. Cornell
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Silk Road Paper
May 2025
Executive Summary
In 2022, violence erupted in four different areas of Central Asia. These episodes of violence were very different from each other, and all were contained within days or weeks. The region has seen little violence since. Yet their occurrence during a single year raised the question whether Central Asia is actually more prone to instability than a cursory overview would suggest.
The episodes of violence in 2022 were varied: one was a conflict over territory between two states, while the other three were internal conflicts, featuring struggles over power and complex center-periphery relations.
In Kazakhstan, demonstrations erupted in January 2022 but were hijacked by forces that sought to implement a coup attempt against the government, making the violence an issue over control over the country’s government. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan both saw violence that featured an element of separatist sentiments and a struggle between center and periphery. In Tajikistan’s Pamiri-populated Gorno-Badakhshan region, the government violently sought to stomp out influential local powerbrokers. In Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan republic, a government bid to reduce local autonomy triggered violent protests. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, inter-state tensions over a contested border triggered the most deadly episode since tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had begun to rise in 2020.
A series of potential factors impact the risk of renewed instability in Central Asia. Internal to the region, these include the economic difficulties the region has experienced in the past decade. In addition, the remarkable resistance to reform that post-Soviet institutions in the region have shown in the past three decades has become increasingly unsustainable in the face of new communication technologies and an emerging post-Soviet generation. Among state institutions, the region’s security services can be identified as the most unreformed and retrograde power centers, and they played influential roles in most of the episodes of violence in the region.
Aggravating these risk factors are the growing disparity between states of the region and the continued malign role of Russian influence, whose array of instruments to undermine stability have only intermittently been deployed across Central Asia.
These risk factors are mitigated by the constructive efforts toward greater regional cooperation in Central Asia, which provide a window into a future where Central Asia is more integrated and able to withstand external pressure, all while internal reform efforts provide greater opportunities for economic development and accountable government.
Special Report: An American Strategy for Greater Central Asia
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
America needs an effective strategy for Greater Central Asia to enhance its competitive position in a region that will significantly impact the Russia-China relationship, geopolitical competition in Asia, and key resource markets including uranium, oil, and natural gas. The proposed strategy ensures open access in Greater Central Asia while securing opportunities for profitable American investment through technological partnership, resource development, and logistical facilitation.
FINDINGS:
- Greater Central Asia requires an inclusive regional definition that includes Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and considers Mongolia, Georgia, and Armenia as critical extensions of the core region.
- The region represents significant opportunities for U.S. investment and access to critical resources including uranium, rare earths, and lithium that are increasingly important to America's technological advancement.
- The current U.S. bureaucratic structure hinders a unified regional approach, with different agencies treating interconnected parts of Greater Central Asia as separate regions.
- Greater Central Asia lies at the intersection of multiple nuclear powers' interests, making stability in the region vital to global security.
- The region is central to U.S.-China competition, as China's pathway to Europe and the Middle East runs through Greater Central Asia.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Appoint a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia at the National Security Council to coordinate U.S. strategy and activities across the region.
- Create a non-governmental U.S.-Greater Central Asia Business Council to assist with regional economic integration and standardization.
- Establish a Greater Central Asia Regional Security Framework focused on intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation.
- Rebrand the U.S. platform for regional interaction as C6+1 and prioritize region-wide initiatives over those directed at individual states.
- Accelerate engagement with emerging elites through educational programs and professional advancement opportunities that attract them to the U.S.
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The Caucasus on the Edge of Tomorrow
Michael Hikari Cecire and Laura Linderman
February 27, 2025
The Caucasus is today a region traversing a period of escalating instability and profound transformation. Historically characterized by its fragmentation and diversity, the Caucasus remains a patchwork of overlapping identities, allegiances, and grievances. This delicate balance is being disrupted by external and internal pressures, creating a volatile environment that could reshape the region’s geopolitical and social fabric in the years to come.
