Both in Europe and the United States, this argument is made with increasing frequency but it doesn’t reflect reality.
On October 31, a citizen of Uzbekistan was arrested for the terrorist attack in New York City that led to the death of eight people. The attack drew parallels to a similar truck attack earlier this year in Stockholm, as well as terrorist deeds in Istanbul and St. Petersburg. In these cases the perpetrators were of Uzbek origin. In addition, over 2,000 Central Asians have taken part in the civil war in Syria, fighting for jihadi organizations like the Islamic State or the Nusra Front. Is Central Asia a breeding ground for extremism?
Both in Europe and the United States, this argument is made with increasing frequency. Fingers are being pointed at Central Asian states, as connections are made between the radicalization supposedly going on in Central Asia and the authoritarian character of these governments and their economic problems. In other words, many appear to assume that repression and/or poverty leads to radicalization.
The problem with this analysis is that there is no evidence that these individuals were radicalized in Central Asia. The perpetrators in Stockholm and New York left Uzbekistan almost a decade ago. Neither showed any tendencies toward radical views or behavior in their home country. It appears, instead, that they developed such views while in Sweden and the United States, respectively.
How about all those Central Asians who went to Syria?
Even here, the research that is available suggests that the large majority of fighters decided to travel to Syria while labor migrants in Russia. Over 80 percent of Central Asians that traveled to Syria were recruited there. As the liberal Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta concluded, “the road to ISIS goes through Moscow.”
This means that if we truly want to understand why Central Asians are attracted to extremist groups, it is not enough to point at the governance systems in the region, or their economic situation – even though these may leave much to be desired.
It should also be pointed out that the field of research on violent extremism does not provide any simple answers as to why individuals are radicalized. This is the case especially in a world where far more European than Central Asians have traveled to Syria.
Migrants from Central Asia, in fact, do share some commonalities with the young citizens of Europe that traveled to the Middle East for jihad: a quest for identity and meaning in life.
The Soviet legacy of atheism means that many young people in Central Asia, just like in suburbs across Europe, did not grow up with a strongly rooted religious tradition that could form a counterweight to extremism.
Meanwhile, their societies are changing at a furious pace. The new states of Central Asia are trying to develop new and compelling national identities, but that process takes considerable time.
As a Kazakh researcher pointed out to me, the big question facing the young generation is: Who am I? What do I believe in?
In Central Asia, governments are rather effective at countering extremist groups: a 16-year old in Uzbekistan is not likely to have easy access either to extremist preachers or websites. But when they leave their home countries to work in Russia, Turkey, Europe, or the United States, they encounter groups that compete to fill their life with meaning. A small minority of them – again, just like in suburbs across Europe – appear to fall prey to the simplified and hate-filled worldview of extremists.
Meanwhile, what is really going on in Central Asia?
The region’s two largest countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have both in the past two years introduced comprehensive economic and political reforms, which among other things reduce the power of the presidents, provide for stronger parliaments and judicial systems, and attempt to fight widespread corruption.
They may have long way to travel on this road. But to point at the weaknesses of these states is in no sense helpful to understand why some Central Asians in exile are drawn to extremism.
Svante Cornell is Director of the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and a co-founder of the Institute for Security and Development Policy.
Dealing With Turkey: Taking the Long View
By Svante E. Cornell
October 31, 2017
The U.S.-Turkish relationship has recently become so bad that analysts in both countries now wonder if it is beyond repair. There are good grounds for the worsening of this relationship, not least President Tayyip Erdoḡan’s increasingly blatant anti-Americanism. But going forward, American leaders must not make the mistake of equating Turkey with Erdoḡan. They must devise a policy that maintains a long-term view of Turkey as an American ally.
Relations between the U.S. and Turkey have been deteriorating since at least 2013. Much of the blame goes to the Turkish strongman. Under Tayyip Erdoḡan’s leadership, Turkey developed an increasingly Islamist and authoritarian direction. Erdoḡan’s foreign policy became adventurist, increasingly and at odds with American interests after the Arab uprisings in 2011. To gain influence, his government began supporting Islamist groups ranging from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to jihadi groups in Syria. Not staying at that, Erdoḡan developed increasingly anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric, often obliquely and sometimes directly blaming some combination of Jews and America for Turkey’s problems.
These tendencies worsened with the July 2016 coup attempt against Erdoḡan. The United States was slow to condemn the coup, which Erdoḡan blames on Pennsylvania-based preacher Fethullah Gülen. There is indeed good reason to think that supporters of Gülen in the Turkish military were implicated in the coup. Erdoḡan’s conspiratorial worldview cannot countenance that a network led from Pennsylvania could operate without guidance from American authorities – or that American prosecutors can hold an Erdoḡan acolyte, Iranian-Turkish businessman Reza Zarrab, without guidance from the “deep state.”
Worse, Erdoḡan appears to think the Trump administration could just hand these individuals over by bureaucratic fiat. Indeed, Erdoḡan seems to think that lashing out against America makes it more likely that he gets his way.
In fact, he has good reason for this. During Barack Obama’s tenure, the U.S. largely tolerated such misbehavior. For eight years, Washington responded with appeasement to Turkish provocations – such as Erdoḡan’s threat to expel the American ambassador, or his repeated accusations that America orchestrated the 2013 protests against him. Summing up the mood in Ankara, a key advisor to President Erdoḡan was once overheard telling his president that “Americans are weak, if we push hard they will back off.”
However, Erdoḡan miscalculated the changes in Washington since the Trump Administration took over. Apparently, Washington’s patience with such abuse had run out, as had its appetite for appeasement. Going forward, it is tempting to focus on Erdoḡan’s appalling policies, and conclude that Turkey can no longer be a U.S. ally. Calls to kick Turkey out of NATO or leaving the base at Incirlik are growing. However, the question is: would such policies serve U.S. interests or make Turkey a more pliable partner?
Erdoḡan wants to be equated with Turkey, but America should not fall into that trap. Erdoḡan’s rule is increasingly authoritarian precisely because he is no longer able to win elections fair and square. At least half of the population vehemently opposes him. As Erdoḡan insists on controlling all major issues personally, the economy is stagnating. While Erdoḡan appears unassailable, his opponents are sensing weakness.
Erdoḡan’s Justice and Development Party, having been reduced to no purpose except expressing its love for the leader, is in deep disarray. A recent internal poll shows the party at around 35 percent of the vote, a far cry from the 49 percent it received in 2015. This summer, main opposition leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu attracted widespread support when he walked the 300 miles from Ankara to Istanbul to protest Erdoḡan’s judicial abuses. Meanwhile, a new political movement led by former Interior Minister Meral Ak?ener has broken away from the sclerotic Nationalist Action Party. If it succeeds in adopting a center-right identity, it could threaten Erdoḡan’s core voter base.
The point is that Erdoḡan’s rule is not forever, and Washington should not fall into the trap of equating the country with its leader. American policymakers must focus on the long-term: while responding to Erdoḡan, they must consider policies that could help restore the U.S.-Turkish relationship in the future.
The Trump administration did the right thing by indicating to Erdoḡan that his behavior has consequences. But America needs a coherent strategy in Turkey, including increasing America’s leverage by reducing its dependence on Turkey. This means keeping the U.S. presence at the Incirlik base, but increasing redundancy by boosting cooperation with partners from Jordan to Georgia. Second, American officials must counter Erdoḡan’s anti-American propaganda. Today, a vast majority of Turks are hostile to the U.S. This was not always the case, and need not be in the future if proper public diplomacy efforts are undertaken.
America must also carefully review its Syria policy. In the short term, support for Kurdish forces there may make sense – especially since Erdoḡan’s Turkey has hardly behaved like an ally there. However, in the long term, U.S. support for the fragmented Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq may backfire. It will alienate not just Erdoḡan’s supporters, but all Turks, who rightly point out that some Syrian Kurds supported by America are under the effective control of anti-Turkish terrorist groups. America will need to balance these interests carefully.
Turkey is not yet lost. American officials must take steps to rekindle respect for the U.S. in Ankara. However, they must also work toward the long-term goal of rebuilding, after Erdoḡan, the U.S.-Turkish alliance.
Svante E. Cornell is Director of the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Policy Advisor the Gemunder Center at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America with a focus on Turkey and the Caucasus. He is a co-founder of the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.
Turkey has a unique position in the Muslim world as a country that held the Caliphate for several hundred years but then turned into a secular republic. Over the past ninety years, Islam has coexisted uneasily with the Turkish state, which has tried both to co-opt and suppress a powerful political Islamic movement that began gathering force in the 1960s. Turkey is unique in the fact that a movement rooted in political Islam managed not only to come to power in democratic elections, but proved able to stay in power and continue to win elections for over a decade. Whereas this aspect of the Turkish experience is widely lauded by Western observers, there is nevertheless another side to the coin. As the power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) grew, they also turned increasingly authoritarian and Islamist. Turkey’s experience is indicative of the broader nature of “moderate” political Islam, and its relationship with democracy; it suggests that “moderate Islamism” has embraced the mechanics of electoral democracy but not its fundamental values.