EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America needs an effective strategy for Greater Central Asia to enhance its competitive position in a region that will significantly impact the Russia-China relationship, geopolitical competition in Asia, and key resource markets including uranium, oil, and natural gas. The proposed strategy ensures open access in Greater Central Asia while securing opportunities for profitable American investment through technological partnership, resource development, and logistical facilitation.

FINDINGS:

1. Greater Central Asia requires an inclusive regional definition that includes Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and considers Mongolia, Georgia, and Armenia as critical extensions of the core region.
2. The region represents significant opportunities for U.S. investment and access to critical resources including uranium, rare earths, and lithium that are increasingly important to America's technological advancement.
3. The current U.S. bureaucratic structure hinders a unified regional approach, with different agencies treating interconnected parts of Greater Central Asia as separate regions.
4. Greater Central Asia lies at the intersection of multiple nuclear powers' interests, making stability in the region vital to global security.
5. The region is central to U.S.-China competition, as China's pathway to Europe and the Middle East runs through Greater Central Asia.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Appoint a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia at the National Security Council to coordinate U.S. strategy and activities across the region.
2. Create a non-governmental U.S.-Greater Central Asia Business Council to assist with regional economic integration and standardization.
3. Establish a Greater Central Asia Regional Security Framework focused on intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation.
4. Rebrand the U.S. platform for regional interaction as C6+1 and prioritize region-wide initiatives over those directed at individual states.
5. Accelerate engagement with emerging elites through educational programs and professional advancement opportunities that attract them to the U.S.

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By Halil Karaveli

Ocalan has some incentive to take Bahceli’s—and by extension the Turkish government’s—proposal seriously. Although the PKK is still able to execute the occasional terrorist attack against Turkish targets, it has lost its military campaign in Turkey. The group survives in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, where its headquarters are located. But there, too, Turkey’s drones and a ring of forward bases have hemmed in the PKK, preventing the group from using northern Iraq’s mountainous terrain to stage attacks into Turkey. Ankara’s close partnership with the Kurdistan Regional Government, which leads the semiautonomous Iraqi region, further reduces the PKK’s room for maneuver. With the group’s military prospects looking grim, Ocalan, who is entering his late 70s, has reason to get behind a political solution. Back in 2013, he was quoted as saying, “I want to see peace before I die.”

The political opening in Turkey raised hopes for a settlement with the PKK, but it is the recent fall of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad that could truly presage the group’s end. Offshoots of the PKK remain active in and in control of northeastern Syria, where their militants have fought alongside the United States in the battle against the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS. But with the collapse of the Assad regime comes an opportunity for Kurdish-majority regions in northern Syria and their militias to be integrated with the rest of the country. Losing this safe haven could be the last straw for an already weakened PKK.

Photo by Asmaa Waguih for "Foreign Policy Magazine: PKK Female Fighters Photo Gallery"

The end of the organization, however, is far from certain. The Turkish government has tried peace negotiations with the PKK before, in 2009 and 2013, to no avail. And despite Ocalan’s status in the group, it is not a given that the Iraqi-based acting leadership would heed his call to disarm and disband. Indeed, the day after Bahceli advanced his proposal for Ocalan’s release, the PKK carried out a terrorist attack at a military-industrial complex outside Ankara, killing five civilians. Moreover, if an agreement with the PKK is not part of a larger arrangement securing the equal status and democratic rights of Turkey’s Kurdish population, simmering discontent could once again spill over into armed insurgency. And if a militarized, semiautonomous, U.S.-backed Kurdish region across the border in Syria continues to harbor fighters and fuel secessionist aspirations, the threat of a PKK resurgence would remain.

These obstacles cannot be discounted. But the confluence of the domestic political developments in Turkey and disruption across the region has raised the possibility that they can be overcome. More than at any time in recent history, there is a real prospect that the PKK could disband—finally removing a threat that has plagued Turkey for the past 40 years.

SAFE HAVEN

Syrian support has long been vital to the PKK’s survival. From the early 1980s, the Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad allowed Ocalan and his followers a base of operations on Syrian-controlled territory. Assad was an ally of the Soviet Union, and the PKK adhered to Marxism-Leninism until the end of the Cold War. His backing of the PKK endured into the 1990s, in part driven by Syria’s historic resentment of Turkey since the Turkish annexation in 1939 of Alexandretta, a province that at that time belonged to the French mandate of Syria. Only in 1998 did Assad expel Ocalan, yielding to the threat of military intervention by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. Ocalan was captured in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 1999 and promptly extradited to Turkey. The PKK relocated its headquarters to Qandil in 2003 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, exploiting the power vacuum created when Saddam Hussein was overthrown.

Syria assumed renewed importance for the PKK after the start of the country’s civil war. In 2012, Bashar al-Assad withdrew government forces from northeastern Syria, allowing a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to establish a proto-state—the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava or western Kurdistan—in the region, which has a large Kurdish population. Assad, in effect, handed control of a third of his country, including most of its oil fields, to Kurdish authorities. In return, the Kurdish militias ceased their armed resistance to the regime, thus weakening the larger opposition movement. And Assad was able to deal a blow to Turkey, which was supporting the uprising against his rule.

Turkey has tried peace negotiations with the PKK before, to no avail.

Turkey, fearing that the empowerment of the PKK’s Syrian offshoot would embolden the broader organization, initiated peace negotiations with Ocalan in 2013. But after the PKK attempted to seize control of urban centers in the Kurdish-majority provinces of southeastern Turkey in 2015, talks broke down, and the Turkish army launched a campaign to dislodge militants from the cities. The PKK was defeated in Turkey, but it lives on through close links with the Syrian-based PYD and its military units. The PYD is incorporated into the Kurdistan Communities Union, an umbrella organization founded in 2005 that embraces the political goals of the PKK and is led by Ocalan. PKK members have joined the YPG, which makes up the bulk of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the coalition that serves as the military force of northeastern Syria’s self-governing region and is a close U.S. partner in the fight against ISIS. The commander in chief of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, is a former PKK member who worked with Ocalan when the latter resided in Syria.

Turkey has carried out three limited military operations against the PKK’s affiliates in Syria: in the al-Bab region in 2016, in the Afrin region in 2018, and in a corridor running between the cities of Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in 2019. The Turkish military maintains a partial buffer zone in northern Syria, but the U.S. military presence in the region has so far deterred a full-scale Turkish intervention to eliminate PKK-affiliated militias. The official U.S. mission is to provide training, combat support, and military cover to the SDF, but in practice this means that U.S. forces work with the YPG. For Ankara, the difference between the YPG and the PKK is merely one of branding. Washington’s collaboration with the Kurdish militias in Syria has thus complicated U.S.-Turkish relations.

THE PRESSURE BUILDS

With Assad gone, however, the proto-state in northeastern Syria may no longer be viable—and the United States will have to consider options other than relying on PKK affiliates to prevent the return of ISIS. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist group that overthrew the Syrian regime in December, has rejected a proposal from Kurdish authorities for a federal system that would allow them to retain their autonomy. The group now leading Syria has a history of clashing with the Kurds: in 2012, after Kurdish authorities first took control in northeastern Syria, HTS’s predecessor, the Turkish-backed jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra, entered Syria from Turkey to attack the Kurdish militias. More recently, Ahmed al-Shara, HTS’s leader and Syria’s transitional president, has stated that the SDF should be integrated into the national army so that military power will be “in the hands of the state alone.” And Syria’s new defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, told reporters in January that HTS has a backup plan should the SDF refuse to negotiate, stating, “If we have to use force, we will be ready.”

In the weeks since Assad’s fall, senior Turkish officials have repeatedly emphasized their wish to see the YPG disbanded. In December, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the elimination of the group as Ankara’s “strategic objective,” calling on Syria’s new leaders to dismantle the YPG; expel its commanders, including Syrian ones; and restore central control of all Syrian territory. A few days later, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler echoed that sentiment, stating that Turkey’s “priority is the liquidation of the YPG.”

Syrian support has long been vital to the PKK’s survival.

If HTS and Turkey achieve their objectives, whether through negotiations or by force, the PKK will suffer a fatal blow. From Turkey’s perspective, the main threat is not a military one: the flat terrain along the Syrian-Turkish border is easy to monitor, and unlike the mountainous topography in northern Iraq, it is not suitable for guerrilla warfare. But Ankara does fear that an autonomous, armed, Kurdish-led political entity in Syria could become—if it isn’t already—the focus of Kurdish separatist aspirations in Turkey. That risk has proved manageable in the case of northern Iraq: Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government have good relations, and the PKK has been marginalized there. But Syria is a different matter. The Syrian Kurds have closer bonds with the Kurds in Turkey than the Iraqi Kurds do; many are descendants of the refugees who fled to Syria after the suppression of the first Kurdish uprising in Turkey in 1925. Rojava, therefore, is a pole of attraction that northern Iraq never was. The PKK envisions a decentralized system of self-governance that would span the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. As long as autonomous rule in Syria endures, this dream stays alive.

Now, the biggest obstacle to ending that autonomy and integrating the SDF into a Syrian national force is the United States. Last month, Abdi, the SDF commander, told Le Monde that the group wants the northeastern Syrian region to maintain “administrative autonomy . . . while cooperating with the central government.”He has also affirmed the group’s desire for U.S. forces to remain in Syria to supervise a cease-fire between the SDF and the Syrian National Army, a Turkish-supported militia. But HTS and the Turkish government have rebuffed these aspirations. Only with continued support from the United States can the SDF withstand the pressure from both Syria’s new leaders and their backers in Ankara. Washington, for its part, may be inclined to stand by its Kurdish allies, even at the risk of further estrangement from Ankara. During his Senate confirmation hearing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke of the importance of cooperation with the SDF to keep ISIS in check and warned of the consequences of “abandoning partners” who have made “a great sacrifice.” President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has been vague about the continued presence of the 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria, saying last week that “they don’t need us involved.”

A PATH TO PEACE?

There is still a path, albeit a narrow one, to a political solution that could bring long-term stability. Disbanding and disarming the SDF and ending the autonomous status of northeastern Syria could help stabilize the country as the new Syrian government consolidates control. Turkey, with the principal threat across its border eliminated, could be convinced to drop its more far-reaching demands on the Syrian Kurds, including the expulsion of all YPG commanders from Syria, and encouraged to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with its Kurdish interlocutors in Turkey, including amnesty for PKK militants, the release of imprisoned Kurdish politicians, and the enshrining of equality between Turks and Kurds. (The last aim would require amendments to Turkey’s constitution, which stipulates that only Turkish can be taught as a mother tongue and that every citizen of the Republic of Turkey is a Turk.) The United States can take Turkey up on its offer to assume leadership of the mission to suppress ISIS, and in the process of negotiations over a U.S. withdrawal from Syria, Washington can push both Ankara and Damascus to guarantee rights for the Kurds.

Ankara is not going to concede Kurdish self-rule within Turkey, as some Kurdish activists demand. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire looms large in the minds of Turkish leaders, and the lesson they took is that self-rule inevitably leads to secession. And there is reason to be skeptical that an authoritarian Turkish state would make significant democratic concessions: in November, with outreach to Ocalan already underway, three Kurdish mayors were removed from their offices and charged with abetting “terrorism.”

There is a path, albeit a narrow one, to a political solution.

Yet Turkey’s leaders do seem to recognize the urgency of a settlement. For a state that refused for decades to even acknowledge the existence of the Kurds, the recognition that Kurdish citizens are, in the words of Erdogan’s adviser Mehmet Ucum, “co-owners” of a common republic marks a significant step. And the government is cracking down on the anti-Kurdish far right: in January, Umit Ozdag, the leader of the far-right Victory Party and a fierce critic of the opening to the Kurds, was arrested and charged with “inciting the public to hatred and enmity.” Bahceli’s proposed bargain with Ocalan may not herald a conversion to liberalism, but it does reveal the Turkish political elite’s pragmatism in the face of perceived threats.

Well before the Assad regime collapsed, Ankara was growing worried that regional turmoil could stoke domestic instability. Three weeks ahead of his appeal to Ocalan in October, Bahceli explained, “When we call for peace in the world, we must also secure peace in our own country.” In an address to parliament the same month, Erdogan emphasized the need to “fortify the home front” in the face of “Israeli aggression.” Ankara’s concerns about foreign meddling did not come from nowhere. In November, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described the Kurdish people as Israel’s “natural ally” and said that Israel should strengthen its ties with them. And in October, the pro-PKK newspaper Yeni Ozgur Politika republished a section of Ocalan’s Manifesto for Democratic Civilization, written more than a decade ago, in which he suggested that the PKK could align with the United States and Israel against Turkey. Now that Ocalan has changed his tune—in December, the PKK leader spoke of a “historic responsibility to renew and fortify Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood”—Turkish leaders will not want to miss the opportunity to mend an internal divide that an external power could exploit.

Removing the threat of the PKK will depend on many factors. Ocalan must convince his organization that armed militancy is a dead end after the regime change in Syria. The broader Kurdish population will need to see an opportunity for a better future in Turkey. The United States will need to withdraw from Syria, enabling the Syrian Kurdish militias and government to integrate into a new national body. None of these outcomes are guaranteed, but with foresight from Ocalan, the Turkish government, the new Syrian leadership, and the new U.S. administration, all of them are now within reach.

Read the article here: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/end-pkk

HALIL KARAVELI is a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and the author of Why Turkey Is Authoritarian: From Ataturk to Erdogan.

By Laura Linderman

As Georgia approaches parliamentary elections in October 2024, the South Caucasus state stands at a pivotal juncture. The growing authoritarian tendencies of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party threaten to derail the nation’s democratic progress, and its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this critical moment, the United States needs to act decisively by leveraging congressional measures to support Georgia’s democratic institutions and counter authoritarian influences there.

The problem is acute, because GD appears increasingly willing to resort to drastic measures to maintain its grip on power. Recently, the party openly indicated that it would call for a ban on the country’s political opposition if it gains a constitutional majority in the upcoming elections. 

Georgia’s ruling party has reason to be concerned. Credible international polling by Edison Research suggests that GD is poised for a significant decline in vote share. Those figures reflect growing discontent among the Georgian populace, likely fueled by the government’s authoritarian measures and its failure to address critical economic and social issues. This contrasts sharply with less credible polling by GORBI, which claims GD is set to achieve an unrealistic majority—numbers that GD has never achieved, even at its height in 2012. The credibility of GORBI’s polling is further undermined by the significant public unrest and mass protests in the wake of the country’s passage of a controversial foreign agent law, which has only intensified public dissatisfaction.

It’s no wonder, then, that GD is contemplating potentially drastic political measures to prop up its authority. But its proposal signals a dangerous erosion of democratic norms, and highlights the need for international scrutiny and action, because the implications are profound – both for Georgia’s internal stability and for its international relationships, particularly with the United States and European Union.

Fortunately, Congressional remedies exist. Both the MEGOBARI Act in the House and the Senate’s Georgian People’s Act represent a bipartisan effort to address recent democratic backsliding in Georgia. They aim to impose financial sanctions on individuals undermining democratic processes and human rights, holding accountable those who threaten Georgia’s democratic future. Cumulatively, this legislation underscores the U.S. commitment to supporting the Georgian people, who overwhelmingly support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and to countering malign influences, particularly from Russia. The both Acts’ power lies not only in punitive measures, but also in their potential to influence Georgia’s future trajectory by making it clear that the international community will not tolerate the erosion of democratic values.

The MEGOBARI Act, in particular, provides comprehensive incentives for the U.S. to strengthen Georgia’s democratic institutions based on real progress and reform. These incentives include negotiating a more robust trade agreement, enhancing exchanges and a streamlined visa regime, developing a comprehensive economic and modernization package, providing defense equipment and support, and offering a security assurance framework similar to the Ukraine G7 agreement. These positive incentives are essential to show both the Georgian government and its people that a commitment to democracy and reform will bring tangible benefits.

As Georgia faces the potential for electoral fraud and post-election unrest, this legislation (and its companion in the Senate) offers a critical toolkit for the U.S. to support Georgia’s democratic aspirations. Through them, the U.S. can help ensure a fair electoral process and counter external threats to Georgia’s sovereignty. Ultimately, congressional action should be about empowering Georgians to seize this moment and chart a course toward a more democratic and prosperous future. Washington’s role is to provide the necessary support and tools necessary for Georgia to succeed. 

The stakes are high, because the upcoming elections in Georgia represent not just a domestic political contest, but a defining moment for the country’s future. The international community, led by the United States, needs to be vigilant and proactive in ensuring that this future is democratic, prosperous, and aligned with the values that the Georgian people have repeatedly affirmed. 

Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council

The Republic of Georgia faces a critical juncture ahead of parliamentary elections in October 2024 as escalating political tensions, driven by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party's increasingly authoritarian tendencies, threaten the country’s democratic future and its pro-Western trajectory. This situation demands a nuanced understanding of Georgia's complex political landscape and a strategic response from Western partners. Here, a number of trends are noteworthy.

The first is democratic backsliding and a consolidation of authoritarian power. Georgian Dream, once a self-identified social democratic reformist coalition, has embraced right-wing populism and consolidated power in recent years. Its controversial "foreign agent" law, which went into force on August 1st, is clearly aimed at silencing critical NGOs and media ahead of national elections, and represents a blatant attempt to curtail media freedom, target civil society, and suppress dissent.

The second are the shifting power dynamics in Georgian society. A new generation, disillusioned by GD's policies and yearning for a European future, is at the forefront of today’s opposition, shifting the locus of resistance from traditional political parties to street protests. Youth see the West as Georgia's only viable path, but their impact is limited by their concentration in the national capital, easy disillusionment and high standards, as well as potential election apathy or disorganization. Despite these potential pitfalls, this generational divide creates a possible opportunity for a new political class to emerge, uniting youth activism with experienced civil society actors. This could happen, post-election, if the remnants of the old elite political class emigrate amid government crackdown.

Third, we are witnessing an erosion of public trust. In recent months, governmental actions have played on existing societal issues like corruption, inequality, and a sense of injustice, fueling widespread discontent and emigration. Nevertheless, the opposition is currently weak and disorganized, and has not shown any focus on these issues. Opposition dynamics continue to be largely centered on mostly unpopular personalities in the political elite, rather than any particular socio-political movement. However, popular discontent with GD has crested because of its anti-Western and anti-democratic positions, which gives even a fractured opposition a potential opportunity heading into the elections. The escalating use of force against largely peaceful protesters has only deepened the chasm between the government and the people. Emigration from Georgia doubled in 2023, primarily driven by those seeking work abroad. And Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index indicates a notable three point decline for Georgia over the past year.

Finally, there is a misunderstanding of how Georgians see "The West." U.S. foreign policy professionals often underestimate the deep-seated resentment towards the former ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM), and overestimate the depth of pro-Western sentiment in Georgia. The prevalent narrative of overwhelming pro-Western sentiment in Georgia, often quantified as 80-85% support, is simplistic and in some respects misleading, ignoring complex realities on the ground. While the pro-west moorings of the population are resilient, they are tempered by popular frustration with Western inattention and popular prioritization of local socioeconomic issues.

Western actors bear some responsibility for this state of affairs, often equating Westernization with superficial markers like proficiency in English. The West has also largely taken pro-west sentiments for granted, and shown little initiative to integrate Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures – giving anti-Western actors an opportunity to gain ground. Moreover, for a certain segment of the Georgian population that is quite poor and lists economic issues at the top of its concern, support for the West is shallow. For these voters, the populist, right-wing narrative (stressing order, stability, unity, and control over culture,) may be more comfortable and understandable. 

HIGH STAKES FOR THE FUTURE OF GEORGIAN DEMOCRACY

Against this backdrop, the upcoming parliamentary elections are crucial, with a high likelihood of GD resorting to fraud to maintain its grip on power. As such, the potential for post-election unrest and violence is significant, with a legitimate risk of external actors, particularly Russia, exploiting the instability for their own benefit. As a result, the U.S., historically (though unintentionally) indifferent to the nuances of Georgian politics, now faces a critical inflection point in its relationship with Georgia. 

Here, a nuanced American policy – one that strengthens democratic institutions, imposes consequences for anti-democratic behavior, and doubles down on support for Georgia’s pluralistic development – would go a long way toward setting Tbilisi on the right path once more. By leveraging diplomatic, economic, and security tools, the U.S. and its allies can play a crucial role in supporting Georgia's democratic future. But this support must be coupled with a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges involved, and with a willingness to impose concrete consequences for democratic backsliding. 

Ultimately, it remains up to Georgians to seize this moment and chart a course towards a more stable, prosperous, and democratic future. Washington’s job is to give them the tools to do so. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council. 

A US strategy for the Black Sea is long overdue. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the involvement of the US, Europe, Iran, and North Korea, have created new geopolitical realities around the area.

While a broad range of political, maritime, economic, and energy security issues have increased the need for clarity in the US approach, one particular recent development is urgent and needs answers.

Russia’s Black Sea fleet has taken a beating from Ukraine. In all, 15 warships have been sunk and 12 damaged in the past two years, most recently the missile corvette Ivanovets on January 31.

That has forced Russia to look for harbors further east, such as Novorossiysk and Tuapse. But there is no safety from Ukrainian aerial and maritime drones there either, as indicated by a January 28 strike on the latter port’s oil refinery.

Recognizing the risk, Russia plans to reactivate a small Soviet-era military facility in Ochamchire in Abkhazia, a Georgian region illegally occupied by Russia. Currently, Ochamchire is a base for Russian FSB patrol boats and is not capable of harboring large naval vessels.

The decision has significant implications for Georgia and its Black Sea-Caspian neighbors, threatening the viability of important trade routes.

Here, some context is necessary. Georgia’s Black Sea ports are in close proximity to Ochamchire and are already serving as connecting links between Europe and wider areas of Central Asia, which includes a range of countries stretching from the South Caucasus to China’s western Xinjiang region.

Ochamchire is also fairly close to the potential point of entry for the planned subsea power cable connecting South Caucasus sources of green energy to the European Union (EU) countries of Romania and Hungary.

This strategic role of the Eastern Black Sea is frequently missing from EU and US policy documents.

Non-EU littoral states are not included in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), for example. At the same time, the Black Sea ports of Georgia and the so-called “Middle Corridor,” linking the South Caucasus to Central Asia, provide Europe with access to vast resources of energy, metals, coal, cotton, and other goods, as well as to growing markets in an emerging region.

This latter role is particularly important; for Central and Eastern European states, saddled with a decades-long dependency on Russian resources and Russia-linked infrastructure, the South Caucasus and Central Asia can serve as a major potential alternative. This importance may only grow with the post-war development and reconstruction of Ukraine that will follow the current war.

The Middle Corridor, running between Kazakhstan and Georgian Black Sea ports and the Mediterranean ports of Turkey, allows Central Asian states to bypass the geopolitically unstable Russian route.

Some of the claims for this route are overblown. It’s unlikely it will become a major corridor connecting China and Europe. There are significant geographic, political, economic, and governance issues associated with this, meaning it will be unable to match maritime, or other land-based transportation options between China and the EU.

At the same time, the Middle Corridor is extremely important for the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

According to multiple studies, (see World Bank study, EBRD) the transshipment potential of the Middle Corridor between Europe and Asia via the Caspian Sea will continue to grow and play an increasingly important role between the growing economies of Central Asia/South Caucasus and EU and Mediterranean markets. This will require a combination of investment and efficiency measures and more vigorous intra-regional coordination.

The only suitable outlet for this route is Georgia; the other countries are landlocked and need to transit neighboring states to reach open seas and markets.

But the absence of firm security guarantees from NATO or other military allies also makes Georgia and its Black Sea ports vulnerable.

Russia’s willingness to use military force and gray zone attacks in the Black Sea increases political risk. One way to mitigate this is to engage as many countries as possible in trade and transit via Georgia. Once Georgian ports are important to others, such as Turkey, China, India, and the Gulf States, the pressure for peace can balance potential threats.

Georgia also needs to develop naval defense capabilities with drones and air defense systems and rebuild civil defense and military reserve systems to create at least a basic level of deterrent to Russian aggression.

The US Black Sea Strategy should incorporate support for the free flow of goods and mineral resources between Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Mamuka Tsereteli, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council/Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: S. Frederick Starr, is a distinguished fellow specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus at the American Foreign Policy Council and founding chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.

The good news is that friends of Ukraine have largely succeeded in overcoming the artificial and self-destructive taboo against supporting Ukraine that the US has imposed on itself. The bad news is that – each time – Kyiv’s American skptics seem to succeed in significantly slowing down US support.

Unacknowledged in large parts of official Washington is the reality that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have had to pay for this procrastination with their lives. Had there been a hundred or more F-16 fighter jets in the Ukrainian skies a year ago, this cursed war would now be history.

Meanwhile, the US’s puzzling taboo has deliberately tied the hands of the victims of criminal aggression. The US press has reported in detail on how Russia invaded Ukraine, is destroying its cities and villages, and is daily murdering civilians with rockets launched from Russian territory. Yet Washington has effectively prohibited Ukraine from delivering answering strikes on the sources of Russia’s bombings.

Not one US official has publicly admitted that this line has been adopted. Worse, some act as if it doesn’t exist. While his colleagues in the White House have dragged their feet on providing Ukraine with military aircraft, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has unambiguously asserted Ukraine’s right to utilize any weapon at its disposal to expel the occupiers, including strikes on the territory of the aggressor.

An illuminating article published earlier this summer in Newsweek –“Exclusive: The CIA’s Blind Spot about Ukraine War” by William Arkin, revealed the origins and inner workings of the confused US approach. 

At Biden’s behest, CIA Director William Joseph Burns established direct communication with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow as early as in November 2021, that is three months before Russia launched its full-scale attack on Ukraine.

"In some ironic ways… the meeting was highly successful," a senior US intelligence official told Newsweek. “The United States would not fight directly nor seek regime change, the Biden administration pledged. Russia would limit its assault to Ukraine and act in accordance with unstated but well-understood guidelines for secret operations.” 

But, according to Newsweek, “Once Russian forces poured into Ukraine, the United States had to quickly shift gears. The CIA, like the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, had misread Russia's military capacity and Ukraine's resilience as Russia failed to take Kyiv and withdrew from the north.”

Nevertheless, certain clandestine rules of the road apparently agreed to by Burns and Putin were adhered to by the US side. Washington would prohibit Ukraine from carrying out strikes on Russian territory. And, in return, speaking as if for all NATO, Burns sought and gained a promise from the dictator not to attack NATO member countries. 

Burns met with Russian foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin in Ankara in November 2022 and then is believed to have briefed Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky about his “non-agreement” with the Russians. 

Far from criticizing Burns, Arkin emoted on the CIA’s difficulties in keeping an eye on the increasingly unruly Ukrainians, who repeatedly attempted to deliver strikes on targets both in Russian occupied Crimea and Russia itself.

Naryshkin revealed that he and Burns discussed, "thought about and deliberated on what should be done about Ukraine" in a lengthy phone call on June 30, initiated by the US side.

Over the 560+ days of Russia’s so-called “special military operation,” and tens of thousands of documented warcrimes, instances of torture, shootings and rape, Burns and the CIA have remained silent on Russia, while apparently issuing threats to Ukraine. On July 5, a CIA spokesperson warned that if Kyiv continued acts of sabotage within Russia it could have “disastrous consequences.” 

What other catastrophic consequences are the people in Burn’s office expecting will occur through the fault of the Ukrainians?

All thinkable and unthinkable catastrophes have already happened as a result of the covert Burns-Putin deal. Yet Newsweek was beside itself with pride at Burns’ diplomatic success and expressed anger at the Ukrainians for trying to defend their country by violating the “ground rules” that Burns was seeking to impose on them without their consent.

The bipartisan pro-Ukrainian majority in the post-vacation Congress would do well to organize hearings to which they should invite Blinken, Burns, Arkin and those sources in the CIA whom he cites in his article. They should also invite National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who has been singing in the same key as Burns. 

The hearings should seek answers to the following questions:

1. Does there exist an agreement between the governments of the US and the Russian Federation about “rules of the road” of the Russo-Ukrainian war?

2. If so, why were Congress and the American people unaware of them until now?

3. If not, then on what basis is Burns imposing these “road rules” on Ukraine?

4. Should Congress even regard Burns’ actions as treasonous? 

We do not have to live in such a world and accept the rules they seek to impose on us.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
Dr. Frederick Starr, a co-founder (with George Kennan and James Billington) of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, is chairperson of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and has written two dozen books on Russia and the USSR.

Dr. Andrei Piontkovsky is a Russian scientist, political writer and analyst, member of International PEN Club who was forced to leave Russia in 2016. For many years he has been a regular political commentator for the BBC World Service, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Piontkovsky is the author of several books on the Putin presidency.  In 2017, Piontkovsky was awarded the Andrei Sakharov Prize for “Courage in Journalism.”