By Laura Linderman

As Georgia approaches parliamentary elections in October 2024, the South Caucasus state stands at a pivotal juncture. The growing authoritarian tendencies of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party threaten to derail the nation’s democratic progress, and its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this critical moment, the United States needs to act decisively by leveraging congressional measures to support Georgia’s democratic institutions and counter authoritarian influences there.

The problem is acute, because GD appears increasingly willing to resort to drastic measures to maintain its grip on power. Recently, the party openly indicated that it would call for a ban on the country’s political opposition if it gains a constitutional majority in the upcoming elections. 

Georgia’s ruling party has reason to be concerned. Credible international polling by Edison Research suggests that GD is poised for a significant decline in vote share. Those figures reflect growing discontent among the Georgian populace, likely fueled by the government’s authoritarian measures and its failure to address critical economic and social issues. This contrasts sharply with less credible polling by GORBI, which claims GD is set to achieve an unrealistic majority—numbers that GD has never achieved, even at its height in 2012. The credibility of GORBI’s polling is further undermined by the significant public unrest and mass protests in the wake of the country’s passage of a controversial foreign agent law, which has only intensified public dissatisfaction.

It’s no wonder, then, that GD is contemplating potentially drastic political measures to prop up its authority. But its proposal signals a dangerous erosion of democratic norms, and highlights the need for international scrutiny and action, because the implications are profound – both for Georgia’s internal stability and for its international relationships, particularly with the United States and European Union.

Fortunately, Congressional remedies exist. Both the MEGOBARI Act in the House and the Senate’s Georgian People’s Act represent a bipartisan effort to address recent democratic backsliding in Georgia. They aim to impose financial sanctions on individuals undermining democratic processes and human rights, holding accountable those who threaten Georgia’s democratic future. Cumulatively, this legislation underscores the U.S. commitment to supporting the Georgian people, who overwhelmingly support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and to countering malign influences, particularly from Russia. The both Acts’ power lies not only in punitive measures, but also in their potential to influence Georgia’s future trajectory by making it clear that the international community will not tolerate the erosion of democratic values.

The MEGOBARI Act, in particular, provides comprehensive incentives for the U.S. to strengthen Georgia’s democratic institutions based on real progress and reform. These incentives include negotiating a more robust trade agreement, enhancing exchanges and a streamlined visa regime, developing a comprehensive economic and modernization package, providing defense equipment and support, and offering a security assurance framework similar to the Ukraine G7 agreement. These positive incentives are essential to show both the Georgian government and its people that a commitment to democracy and reform will bring tangible benefits.

As Georgia faces the potential for electoral fraud and post-election unrest, this legislation (and its companion in the Senate) offers a critical toolkit for the U.S. to support Georgia’s democratic aspirations. Through them, the U.S. can help ensure a fair electoral process and counter external threats to Georgia’s sovereignty. Ultimately, congressional action should be about empowering Georgians to seize this moment and chart a course toward a more democratic and prosperous future. Washington’s role is to provide the necessary support and tools necessary for Georgia to succeed. 

The stakes are high, because the upcoming elections in Georgia represent not just a domestic political contest, but a defining moment for the country’s future. The international community, led by the United States, needs to be vigilant and proactive in ensuring that this future is democratic, prosperous, and aligned with the values that the Georgian people have repeatedly affirmed. 

Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council

A US strategy for the Black Sea is long overdue. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the involvement of the US, Europe, Iran, and North Korea, have created new geopolitical realities around the area.

While a broad range of political, maritime, economic, and energy security issues have increased the need for clarity in the US approach, one particular recent development is urgent and needs answers.

Russia’s Black Sea fleet has taken a beating from Ukraine. In all, 15 warships have been sunk and 12 damaged in the past two years, most recently the missile corvette Ivanovets on January 31.

That has forced Russia to look for harbors further east, such as Novorossiysk and Tuapse. But there is no safety from Ukrainian aerial and maritime drones there either, as indicated by a January 28 strike on the latter port’s oil refinery.

Recognizing the risk, Russia plans to reactivate a small Soviet-era military facility in Ochamchire in Abkhazia, a Georgian region illegally occupied by Russia. Currently, Ochamchire is a base for Russian FSB patrol boats and is not capable of harboring large naval vessels.

The decision has significant implications for Georgia and its Black Sea-Caspian neighbors, threatening the viability of important trade routes.

Here, some context is necessary. Georgia’s Black Sea ports are in close proximity to Ochamchire and are already serving as connecting links between Europe and wider areas of Central Asia, which includes a range of countries stretching from the South Caucasus to China’s western Xinjiang region.

Ochamchire is also fairly close to the potential point of entry for the planned subsea power cable connecting South Caucasus sources of green energy to the European Union (EU) countries of Romania and Hungary.

This strategic role of the Eastern Black Sea is frequently missing from EU and US policy documents.

Non-EU littoral states are not included in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), for example. At the same time, the Black Sea ports of Georgia and the so-called “Middle Corridor,” linking the South Caucasus to Central Asia, provide Europe with access to vast resources of energy, metals, coal, cotton, and other goods, as well as to growing markets in an emerging region.

This latter role is particularly important; for Central and Eastern European states, saddled with a decades-long dependency on Russian resources and Russia-linked infrastructure, the South Caucasus and Central Asia can serve as a major potential alternative. This importance may only grow with the post-war development and reconstruction of Ukraine that will follow the current war.

The Middle Corridor, running between Kazakhstan and Georgian Black Sea ports and the Mediterranean ports of Turkey, allows Central Asian states to bypass the geopolitically unstable Russian route.

Some of the claims for this route are overblown. It’s unlikely it will become a major corridor connecting China and Europe. There are significant geographic, political, economic, and governance issues associated with this, meaning it will be unable to match maritime, or other land-based transportation options between China and the EU.

At the same time, the Middle Corridor is extremely important for the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

According to multiple studies, (see World Bank study, EBRD) the transshipment potential of the Middle Corridor between Europe and Asia via the Caspian Sea will continue to grow and play an increasingly important role between the growing economies of Central Asia/South Caucasus and EU and Mediterranean markets. This will require a combination of investment and efficiency measures and more vigorous intra-regional coordination.

The only suitable outlet for this route is Georgia; the other countries are landlocked and need to transit neighboring states to reach open seas and markets.

But the absence of firm security guarantees from NATO or other military allies also makes Georgia and its Black Sea ports vulnerable.

Russia’s willingness to use military force and gray zone attacks in the Black Sea increases political risk. One way to mitigate this is to engage as many countries as possible in trade and transit via Georgia. Once Georgian ports are important to others, such as Turkey, China, India, and the Gulf States, the pressure for peace can balance potential threats.

Georgia also needs to develop naval defense capabilities with drones and air defense systems and rebuild civil defense and military reserve systems to create at least a basic level of deterrent to Russian aggression.

The US Black Sea Strategy should incorporate support for the free flow of goods and mineral resources between Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Mamuka Tsereteli, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council/Central Asia-Caucasus Institute